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Revoking the Driving Privileges of High School
Drop-Outs
I.

INTRODUCTION

Out of growing concern. for the num.ber of high school
drop-outs, several states have enacted license revocation
legíslation. 1 ln general, a license revocation statute requires
the suspension or revocation of the driver's license of any
student who drops out of high school without good cause. 2
Means v. Sidiropolis3 gave the Supreme Court of West
Virgínia the opportunity to hear one of the flrst challenges
to a license revocation statute. ln that case, Gregory Allen
Means, seventeen, dropped-out of high school in order to
support his pregnant wife. 4 Pursuant to West Virgínia's revocation statute, Means' driver's license was revoked. 6 Although the West Virgínia statute provided an exception for
a student who had withdrawn due to "circumstances beyond
[the student's] control,..s Means apparently did not fall into
this exception. The court, with two justices dissenting, sustained the statute's overall constitutionality but reversed
that part of the lower court's opinion which held that the

1.
States which have enacted license revocation laws include: Kentucky,
Louisiana, Tennessee and West Virgínia. The legislatures of several other states
are currently considering similar legislation.
2.
Although not included in the present discussion, West Virginia's license
revocation statute also prohibits the issuance of a driver's license to students who
are not making satisfactory progress in school. See W. VA. CODE § 18-8-ll(aX1)
(1988).
3.
401 S.E.2d 447 rN. Va. 1990).
4.
By the time the appeal was heard by the West Virgínia Supreme Court,
Gregory Means had reached the age of eighteen, thus outside of the statute's
reach. Id. at 449.
5.
The West Virgínia provision reads:
Whenever a student sixteen years of age or older withdraws from
school . . . the attendance director or chief administrator shall notify the
department of motor vehicles of such withdrawal. Within five days of
receipt of such notice, the department . . . shall send notice to the licensee that the license will be suspended . . . unless documentation [of enroll·
ment] . . . is received by the department.
W. VA. ConE § 18-8-ll(b) (1988).
6.
Id. § 18-8-ll(d).
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statute did not violate procedural due process. 7
The Means decision furnishes an interpretive template
with which this article will examine the constitutional issues
raised when a student's driver's license is revoked for dropping-out of school. ln addition, the author will suggest a
means by which state legislators may draft effective, constitutional license revocation statutes.
II.

DUE PROCESS

The opm10n in Means began by acknowledging that the
revocation of a driver's license "implicates due process considerations. "8 lndeed, regardless of whether a state denominates a driver's license as a "privilege" or "right," it is nevertheless a protected "entitlement interest" for due process
purposes. 9
Recognizing that the suspension of a driver's license
implicates due process is but part of the analysis; the axiomatic question remains: What process is due to protect
against unconstitutional government regulation? ln cases not
involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights issues,
procedural due process requires that a court consider the
following factors:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. 10

The United States Supreme Court, in Dixon v. Love, 11
cited these three "Eldridge factors" when it upheld an Illinois statute authorizing the revocation of driver's licenses

7.
Means, 401 S.E.2d at 450.
8.
Id. (citing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)).
9.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); accord Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 539 (1970) (whether considered a privilege or a right, license revocation
legislation must comport with due process); see also LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9, at 686 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter, TRIBE].
10.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
11.
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1976) (per curiam).
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without a prior hearing. 12 Under the statute, the Illinois
Secretary of State was given discretionary authority to revoke or suspend the license of any driver who fell into one
of eighteen categorias. ln applying the Eldridge test, the
Court held that since the statute contained special provisions for hardship and that the "risk of an erroneous deprivation in the absence of a prior hearing [was] not great,"
there was no reason to depart from the "established doctrine" of allowing "less than an evidentiary hearing . . .
prior to an adverse administrative action. "13
lf the Dixon case demonstrates the manner in which
the Eldridge test is applied, how may the case be reconciled
with the Court's earlier holding in Bell v. Burson? 14 ln
Bell, the Court invalidated, on due process grounds, a Georgia statute which mandatorily suspended the driver's license
of motorists who were involved in injury accidents. The
statute mandated the revocation if the affected motorist was
unable to post a bond for the amount of potential damages
incurred by injured parties. The statute in Bell provided for
an administrativa hearing, but of a statutorily limited scope.
Significantly, the issue of potential liability could not be
decided at the hearing. 15
The Supreme Court held that because liability was an
inseparable part of the state's statutory scheme, the inability of the administrativa hearing to consider the question
of liability amounted to a denial of due process. ln the
Court's opinion, due process required two things of the administrativa hearing. First, the hearing must adjudicate the
issue of liability prior to revoking a motorist's license. Second, the hearing is required to be one which would be both
"meaningful" and "appropriate to the nature of the case."16
As it was, the administrativa hearing provided for by the
Georgia legislatura was neither meaningful, in that it could
not consider the core issue of liability, nor appropriate to
the nature of the case, for precisely the sarne reason.
The Court in Dixon "fully" distinguished Bell on the

12.
ILL. REV. STAT. eh. 95112, § 6·206(a) (1975).
13.
Di:ron, 431 U.S. at 113 (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343).
14.
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1970).
15.
See id. at 538.
16.
Id. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950)).
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ground that the statute in Dixon was directed toward an
"important public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in prompt remova! of a safety hazard."17 By contrast, the statute invalidated in Bell was presumably directed toward ensuring that parties injured by negligent drivers
would be compensated.
Th.e following rule can be extracted from the Bell and
Dixon decisions: Where a license is to be revoked pursuant
to a statutory scheme, the focus of which (whether explicit
or implicit) is on the existence of a particular factor, the
licensee must be afforded a hearing, prior to revocation,
which has the power to decide that issue. The only exception to this rule arises when a public safety interest is
involved.
The West Virginia statute which carne before the court
in Means could not possibly pass muster under this rule.
Gregory Means was not provided a hearing to determine
whether his withdrawal from school was for reasons "beyond
his control. "18 Moreover, a reduction of the number of high
school drop-outs, not any public safety interest, was the
primary motivation behind the statute. However, this apparent failure of due process does not require the conclusion
that legislation of a similar nature is doomed; there are
often more ways than one to sustain an act.

III.

AVOIDING THE

DUE

PROCESS ANALYSIS

ln Means, the majority tried to hedge its conclusion
that a state may revoke or suspend student driver's licenses
for a legitimate legislative end (albeit one wholly unrelated
to public safety). The court intimated that the due process
analysis might not even be necessary. 19 Whereas the majority conceded that issued licenses
are protectable
entitlements, nothing in the decision suggests that the majority considered probationary licenses to be of the sarne
genre.
The court's opinion began: "[l]t is important to point out
that persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are
not entitled to regular, unconditional driver's licenses. Rath-

17.
18.
19.

Dixon, 431 U.S. at 114.
See W. VA. CODE § 18-8-ll(d).
See Mea118, 401 S.E.2d at 452.
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er, under [the statute] a person under the age of eighteen
is entitled only to a 'junior' or 'probationary' driver's license. "20 Indeed, this view appears consistent with the bulk
of traditional thought. 21 Whether a protectable entitlement
exists depends upon the wording and construction of the
particular statute which creates the benefit and upon the
"pertinent understanding between government and individuais. "22 Thus when a statute bestows a benefit which creates the reasonable expectation that such benefit will continue, an "entitlement" is said to be created. Conversely, when
a benefit is bestowed under clearly understood terms or
under conditions which avoid the creation of an expectancy,
no property interest is formed. 23 ln context, when a driver
receives his or her license with a clear understanding that
such license is only probationary or conditional, the state
may regulate or restrict its use without fully comporting
with traditional due process requirements. 24 The United
20.
Id.
21.
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). ln Roth, the terms of
employment between a state university and a professor were such that the univer·
sity retained the right not to renew the professor's contract without giving a
reason for its decision. The Court held that the professor had no protectable
property interest since the contract could not have engendered an expectation that
it would be renewed or that the university's exercise of its option not to renew
would be based on good cause. See id. at 578; see also NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTI·
TUTIONAL LAW 547 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter NOWAK]. But at least one commenta·
tor has already criticized the Mea118 opinion, maintaining that the majority in
Mea118 fostered a "profound misconception conceming the nature of licenses and
benefits . . . .w Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1408 (1991).
Nevertheless, the majority in Mea118 did not go so far as to say that revoking
the privilege of a probationary license does not require due process.
22.
TRIBE, supra note 9.
23.
Nowak put it thus:
The Court will recognize interests in govemment benefits as constitution·
al[ly protectable] "property" where a person can be deemed to be "entitled" to them. Thus, the applicable federal, state or local law which governs the dispensation of the benefit must defme the interest in such a
way that the individual should continue to [expect to] receive it under the
terms of the law.
See NOWAK, supra note 21 at 547. Are there any limita to this? Nowak himself
suggested:
[l]f a town refused to accept a particular child into its primary educational system, even though the child appeared to qualify under applicable
law, it is difficult to believe that the concept of . . . entitlement would
eliminate the requirement of a fair procedure to determine the basis for
this action.
Id. But cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) {entitlement to education
implicates due process).
24.
However, this is not true in the case of entitlements which create a depen·
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States Supreme Court has only required clarity in understanding as touching the terms or conditions placed upon
state-created benefits. 25
At a minimum, to avoid a procedural due process challenge to their license revocation legislation, states should
make it clear at issuance that the license is both probationary and conditional, and emphasize that the condition
placed upon the license is the student's continued enrollment in school. 26
IV.

PRoBLEMS WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Unfortunately, the Due Process Clause is not the only
constitutional hoop through which a legislativa act must
jump. Statutes of this type are often ripe with equal protection issues. When a statute burdens a specific class of
individuais "courts must reach and determine the question
whether the classifications drawn in [the] statute are reasonable in light of its purpose. "27 Reasonableness, in tum,
depends on whether or not the class burdened by the statute is one "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state
interest. "28
License revocation statutes affect only a particular class
of individuais: student drivers under the age of eighteen.
Regardless of educational background, drivers over eighteen
are not burdened under these laws. Assuming that probationary driver's licenses are protectable property interests,
would it violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to burden current student drivers, but
leave untouched those drivers who dropped-out decades
earlier?

dent relationship with the govemment regarding basic needs. ln such circumstanc·
es, an opportunity to be heard must be afforded. See TRIBE supra at note 9, 686;
see also United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murrey, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
25.
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). It remains to be seen,
however, whether one can argue that a sixteen-year-old who receives a
license-even a probationary license-fully understands that the license may be
revoked for reasons wholly unrelated to public safety.
ln those few states which have license revocation statutes, most require
26.
proof of enrollment before issuance of the flrst license. This undoubtedly goes a
long way towards instilling upon young drivers the conditional nature of the
license. E.g., W. VA. ConE § 18-8-ll(a) (1988).
27.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per
28.
curiam) (italics added).
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Equal protection's "rationality standard" requires only
that states have a legitimate interest in creating a particular classification. Historically, the courts have given great
deference to most state legislative classifications. Discussing
the rationality standard, the Means majority cited McGowan
v. Maryland. 29 The Supreme Court in McGowan held that
the rationality standard only requires that a legislative
classification be founded on a set of facts which "reasonably
may be conceived to justify it. "80 ln the case of license revocation statutes, the obvious interest served by the law is
a reduction in the number of high school drop-outs. Whether
such st.atutes are effective in attaining this goal can be
questioned, but few would argue that the goal itself is
illegitimate. It also goes without saying that such a statute
must necessarily burden high school students. Because of
the degree of judicial deference afforded legislative classifications in cases like McGowan and DeCastro, 31 it is not surprising that West Virginia's statute, reviewed in Means,
experienced no difficulty under the Equal Protection Clause.
V.

THE

VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND STATUTORY
EXCEPriONS

The Constitution requires that a statute provide a "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices. "32 Admittedly, this measure of vagueness is itself somewhat
vague. To make matters worse, courts have often used the
vagueness doctrine to curb legislation for reasons other than
fair notice.33 With license revocation statutes, the question

29.
Means, 401 S.E.2d at 451 n.2. The court in Means considered McGowan's
hoiding germane to both its equal protection and substantive due process inquiries.
See generally McGowan v. Maryiand, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
30.
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 426.
ln Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976), the Court heid that, for
31.
a classification to fali to an equal protection challenge, there is a required showing
that the classification is "cleariy wrong, [or] a dispiay of arbitrary power . . . . •
See al8o Raiiway Express v. New York 336 U.S. 106 (1949). "It is no requirement
of equal protection that ali evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at ali. •
Id. at 110.
Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951), quoted in GERALD
32.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUI'IONAL LAW 1156-57 n.20 (11th ed. 1985) [hereinafter
GUNTHER].
33.
GUNTHER,

supra note 32, at 1157 n.20 (quoting Note, "The Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court," 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960)).
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of vagueness turns on the degree of specificity found in the
language of the statutory exceptions. The Means dissent,
lead by Justice McHugh, attacked the inexplicit language in
West Virginia's statutory exceptions, contending: "lt is the
general principie of statutory law that a statute must be
definite to be valid. "84
Notwithstanding McHugh's fervor, his bald statement
did little to clarify what the standard should be. McHugh
did say, however, that the vagueness of a statute depends
upon the type of statute involved. 86 Accordingly, he noted
that under the conventional rule, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine should be more forgiving when applied to economic
regulation as opposed to those statutes which impose criminal penalties. Justice McHugh concluded: "Certainly then,
the statute at issue in this case . . . would be subject to
more scrutiny under the vagueness doctrine than a statute
involving economic matters . . . ."36
McHugh's principal complaint was directed toward the
statute's "beyond [the student's] control" exception. 37 The
West Virginia legislatura left the availability of the exception to the exclusive, unreviewable discretion of school officials. ln H ague v. CIO, 38 the Supreme Court confronted a
similar vagueness issue, albeit in a more traditional sense.
ln Hague, the Court invalidated, on vagueness grounds, a
city ordinance which gave wide discretion to city authorities
in issuing permits for public assembly. The Court held that
such discretionary authority would provide city officials the
wherewithal to use "mere opinion" as "an instrument of
arbitrary suppression. "39 This conclusion was aided, in part,
by the fact that the city ordinance in Hague was obviously
One commentator has expressed dissatisfaction with the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and called for its demise: "[T]he Court should determine the case on its
merits in relation to established constitutional guarantees, rather than evade
constitutional issues on the ground of vagueness." Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication: A Survey and Criteria, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON CONSTI11JTIONAL LAW 522, 595 n.272 (1963) (quoting Note, Void For
Vagueness: An Escape From Statutory Interpretation, 23 Ind. L. J. 272, 285 (1948)).
34.
Mea118, 401 S.E.2d at 455 (McHugh, J. dissenting) (citing 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Co118titutional Law § 818 (1979)).
See id. at 455-56 (citing Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Whelling Wholesale
35.
Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1984)).
36.
Id. at 456.
37.
See id.
38.
307 u.s. 496 (1939).
Id. at 516.
39.
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being used by city officials as an instrument to prevent the
circulation of pro-union pamphlets.
It is not im.plausible that a license revocation statute,
which places discretion solely in the hands of school officials, could be subjected to similar discriminatory application. Such unreviewable discretion ought not be given to
school officials to determine ·whether a student has droppedout of school "due to circumstances beyond his or her control," or "for good cause. J040
A few examples by way of illustration are in order.
Imagine a case in which a student, sixteen, quits school to
work in order to pay for his girlfriend's abortion. Will the
School Superintendent's discretion be affected by her personal views on abortion? Suppose instead, a seventeen-year-old
drops out to marry his pregnant girlfriend but needs fulltim.e employment to support her and the child? (The Means
case) Perhaps an equally difficult question arises when a
student drops out to pursue a career such as acting, or to
join the professional tennis circuit. Does the potential for a
six-figure income constitute "good cause?" Should such a
student (who, despite an initially rosy outlook, may end up
completely impecunious) be favored over one who quits
school to go fishing?
ln court, statutes which place discretionary exemptions
solely in the hands of school of:ficials will not stand up as
well as those which employ exceptions in the form of a
"laundry list." Nor will such legislation be congenial to judicial scrutiny when the only court involvement is tied to a
constitutional challenge. When addressing the problem of
vagueness, the legislatures in each state must weigh the
benefits and burdens of these two alternativas.

A. Return to Entitlement Analysis
Perhaps Justice McHugh was unjusti:fied in implying
that West Virginia's revocation statute imposes a punitive
sanction,41 thereby requiring a more rigorous vagueness
analysis. McHugh's argument for a higher standard necessarily hinges on the notion that a probationary driver's
40.
E.g., W. VA. ConE § 18-8-ll(d) (1988) (exception to statute phrased as "cir·
cumstances beyond student's control"); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:431 (West
Supp. 1991) (standard for exemption listed as "acceptable circumstances").
See Means, 401 S.E.2d at 455 (McHugh, J. dissenting).
41.
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license is a protectable entitlement. Indeed, an anomaly
would certainly exist if West Virginia's "criminal" statute
penalized an individual by taking away a right which did
not exist or by confiscating property which the defendant
did not own. ln other words, is McHugh wasting ink by attacking as unconstitutionally vague a statute which infringes
on a mere revokable privilege? Were the majority in Means
given a second chance to counter Justice McHugh's assertion, it might well emphasize that West Virginia's statute
imposes no penalty, but simply sets forth the conditions
that accompany the issuance of every probationary license.
Again, this argument depends upon the "understanding" that
existed between the Department of Motor Vehicles and the
student licensee at the time of issuance. Where conditions
imposed on a probationary driver's license are deemed perfunctory or "vague" so as to give a student licensee the
justified expectation that the license is irrevocable, the statute will likely encounter obstacles in its enforcement.
VI.

DRAFriNG THE PERFECT STATUTE

There is no "perfect" statute and license revocation
statutes are no exception. States that wish to enact such
laws must always balance the risks involved. Defending a
statute in court is never cheap. Moreover, those jurisdictions
which have poor urban areas may not see a lot of benefit,
since fewer students living in crowded, inner-city wards
have access to an automobile. Revoking the driver's license
of a youth who customarily walks or rides the subway will
not have a significant effect. On the other hand, in those
cases in which a statute proves effective, the results will
likely be dramatic.
From the preceding discussion, certain guidelines may
comfortably be set. First, the importance of avoiding the
creation of an entitlement interest cannot be underestimated. Conditions affecting probationary licenses need to be
made clear from first issuance. Second, notice should be
given prior to revocation. 42 Third, an opportunity to appeal

42.
The Tennessee revocation statute, TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-6-3017 (1988),
requires that notice be sent prior to the suspension of the license. ln Louisiana,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:431 (West Supp. 1991) also provides for notice to be sent
prior to the actual cancellation of the student's driver's license, but explicitly states
that "[t]he cancellation shall be imposed without hearing." See id., § 32:431B(2).
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or assert an exemption should be had before officials who
are empowered to adjudicate all of the operativa elements
and exceptions listed in the statute. Finally, exceptions and
exemptions should be phrased in language which does not
create a doubt as to whom they will benefit. As stated earlier, such exceptions should be laundry-listed to avoid confusion.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Innovative legislation always brings mixed results. Because there is no fool-proof guide through the judicial landscape, legislatures often resort to using a degree of "ouija"
analysis in drafting law. Nevertheless, by adhering to the
guidelines diagrammed above, states should have a better
chance of drafting legislation which will both withstand
constitutional challenge and assist educators in improving
the graduation rate of high school students.

Andrew J. Bolton

